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Abstract 
 
Since 2009, Nigeria has gradually slipped into a terrorist enclave where terror 
acts have become the regular signature of the country’s social memoirs. Aside the 
complex permutations of socio-economic and political upheavals already facing 
the polity, the sudden emergence of a supercilious army of terror extremists has 
not only exposed the polity’s unpreparedness for such an intimidating challenge, 
but has also brought a spectral bite to industrial development. Efforts to achieve 
development in industry in the country, a strong criterion for economic 
development and the improvement of the country’s Human Development Indices 
may continue to suffer setbacks in the face of a blistering climate of terror and 
bombings. The effect of terrorist activities such as suicide bombings, kidnappings, 
destruction of lives, public infrastructure, private and entrepreneurial 
investments, the climate of fear, panic and confusion and a heated and 
ungovernable polity has continued to make Nigeria an unsuitable bride for 
foreign investments. This not only poses a threat to the budding democracy in 
place, it also may endanger efforts to achieve industrial development in the 
country. To face this challenge headlong, a multi-stakeholder imperative has 
become inevitable. This research work investigated the role of government, 
private sector, civil society, faith and the international community in fighting the 
terror monster and providing the leeway for industrial development in the 
country, without which the standard of living, employment opportunities and 
other human development indices may maintain their downward trend outright. 
 
Key words: Terrorism, industrial development, multi-stakeholder, government, 
faith. 
 
Introduction 
When the Nigerian government and people were about heaving a sigh of relief from 
their experiences with the Niger Delta militants, many of whom had been 
persuaded to embrace the Amnesty programme of government and promised that 
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the socio-economic pathologies that traumatized the region and necessitated the 
bloody confrontations with government would be addressed, Nigeria and 
Nigerians woke up to the onset of the vociferous calls from a supercilious army of 
terror extremists bent on pursuing their grievances with government in a new 
violent fashion. The Boko Haram sect had appeared as an innocent-looking and 
harmless band of Muslim devotees strutting around the northern region with their 
fiery messages that ordered a return to Islamic law and purity. However, in July 
2009, the outbreak of the Boko Haram uprising in the country marked the 
distasteful beginning of a determined group of terror merchants who initiated a 
recurring pattern of violent and bloody riots, attacks and bombings. What started 
as an insurgency against the state and its institutions, gradually assumed political, 
religious and socio-economic permutations as not only police stations, army 
barracks, government establishments were targeted but also banks, businesses, 
churches, Christians, Christian leaders and later mosques and some Muslim clerics 
fell to the raging inferno of Boko Haram violence. The alarming dimensions of the 
Boko Haram’s terror acts were particularly their forceful attempt to impose a 
religious ideology on a constitutionally recognized secular state and their 
introduction of suicide terrorism on Nigerian soil, a tradition alien to Nigeria and 
Nigerians. 
 
Thus, terrorism, which had been viewed by some publics in the country as a 
predominantly Western narrative, and supposedly a Western conundrum, had 
become a Nigerian issue fomented by some Nigerians to express their grievances. 
So clinical was the prosecution of their terror agenda that fighting terrorism went 
straight to the top of the political agenda in the country far ahead poverty, crime, 
underdevelopment, poor health provisions, asymmetrical power relations and 
resource distributions, corruption and ethnicity even though these factors have 
been fingered as partly responsible for the emergence of this monster (Adesoji, 
2010; Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, 2008; Ipe, Cockayne & Miller, 2010; 
Okafor, 2011). The Nigerian state, through the perversion of its leadership style, 
continued neglect of its responsibilities to the people, byzantine corruption, poor 
governance, weak and compromised institutions realized it had created its own 
lethal Frankenstein. The Boko Haram sect has again brought to bold relief, like its 
forebears had repeatedly done, that there is an inexorable linkage between security 
and development. It has also shown that the realization of the country’s industrial 
development will be far more difficult so long as it remains vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks, recruitment, radicalization, and penetration, which threaten not only its 
political stability and therefore the investment and growth climate in the country, 
but also casts a spectral pall on government’s efforts to respond to the calls for 
rapid industrialization. 
 
This study is focused on examining the spin-off of terrorism in Nigeria as it reins 
in industrial development and canvasses a multi-stakeholder imperative to 
address this distended challenge. In particular, the study looks at the role of 
government, private sector, civil society, faith and international community in 
resisting the terror ogre, so that industrial development can be realised to meet the 
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yearnings of a disenchanted and bored population seeking answers to existing poor 
standard of living, rising unemployment and embarrassing human development 
indices which presently characterize the country’s state of affairs. 
 
Defining Terrorism and Industrial Development  
Terrorism has been defined as “The unlawful use of force or violence against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, 
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Trosper, 
2009). The United States Department of Defense defines it as “the calculated use 
of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to 
coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are 
generally political, religious, or ideological.” Quoted in Omotola (2010), The 
African Union (AU) sees terrorism as “any act which is a violation of the criminal 
laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom 
of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any member or group of persons 
or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, 
environmental or cultural heritage”. Terrorism has been described as the “criminal 
acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a 
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes that are in any 
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them” (UN, 1994). Bockstette (2008) sees terrorism as political 
violence in an asymmetrical conflict designed to induce terror and psychic fear 
(sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of 
noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols), involving acts meant to send a 
message from an illicit clandestine organization. He argues further that the 
purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum 
attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the 
targeted audience(s) and reach short- and mid-term political goals and/or desired 
long-term purposes. 
 
In sum, terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. 
As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the 
advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the clandestine nature 
and small size of terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear 
organization to defend against or to deter. Terrorism is a criminal act that 
influences an audience beyond the immediate victim and the strategy of terrorists 
is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the 
government, and the world to their cause. Terrorists plan their attacks to obtain 
the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. 
 
Industrial development, on the other hand, has become an important mode of 
production in modern society and the key in classifying countries as developed, 
underdeveloped, developing or emerging economies based on their level of 
industrialization. As Onyeonoru (2005) asserted, industry provides livelihoods for 
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millions of people all over the world because it creates a massive pool of 
employment opportunities for white- and blue-collar workers. Through the 
deployment of modern technologies, division of labor, specialized skills and large-
scale production, organized economic activity is consummated resulting in the 
production, manufacture, or construction of a particular product or range of 
products. Onyeonoru (2005) lists the elements of industrial production to include 
the following: 
 
 The possibility of utilising technologies with complex machinery associated 
with large scale production; 
 The utilization of a wide range of raw materials often already processed 
through the use of complex technologies; 
 A relatively complex technical division of labour within units of production; 
 Complex cooperation and coordination of specialized tasks inside the unit 
of production; 
 And a diverse range of skills within the workforce. 
 
Imhonopi (2004) argues that industrialization in Nigeria over the years is low 
because of factors such as poor infrastructural development, low level of 
technology, inadequate capital, poor state of the agricultural sector, low manpower 
development, poor planning and implementation, high degree of dependence on 
foreign raw materials, political instability, unfavourable government policies, 
entrenched official corruption, tribalism and nepotism. While these factors are 
true, another challenge that may further set the country back in achieving rapid 
industrialization is the deepening terrorist activities in Nigeria especially as 
triggered by the Boko Haram terror machine. 
 
The Debouchment of Terrorism in Nigeria 
The foundation for armed insurrection (and later terrorism) against the Nigerian 
state was laid when Isaac Adaka Boro, an Ijaw nationalist led an armed campaign 
for greater Niger Delta autonomy, resource control and self-determination for the 
inhabitants of the Niger Delta. As the founder and leader of the Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed militia consisting members from his fellow 
Ijaw ethnic groups, Isaac Boro rose to address what he saw as the marginalization 
and subjugation of his people and their economic interests by the Nigerian state 
(Okafor, 2011). With a force of 150 recruits, who were given training in the use of 
firearms and explosives in the creeks and bushes, he and his men attacked a police 
station on February 23, 1966, raided the armory and kidnapped some officers, 
including the officer in charge of the police station. They also blew up oil pipelines, 
engaged the police in a gunfight, and declared the Niger Delta an independent 
republic. The revolt was however suppressed and Boro and his compatriots were 
put on trial on a 9-count charge of treason at Port Harcourt Assizes before Judge 
Phil Ebosie (Okafor, 2011). Boro was found guilty and was jailed for treason. 
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However, the federal government led by General Yakubu Gowon granted him 
amnesty on the eve of the Nigerian civil war in May 1967. He enlisted and was 
commissioned a major in the Nigerian army and fought on the side of the federal 
government, but was killed in active service in 1968 at Ogu in River State. 
 
Many years later, Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots formed the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which advocated the 
rights of the Ogoni people; demanding increased autonomy, a fair share of the 
proceeds of oil extraction, and remediation of environmental damage to their 
lands. He was successful in drawing global attention to their cause through his 
peaceful non-violent measures but paid the ultimate price when in 1995 he was 
sentenced to death by the Abacha military junta for a crime he was purportedly 
accused of committing. In the words of the Human Right Watch, “the hanging of 
Saro-Wiwa in November 1995 could be said to be the turning point in the politics 
of the Niger Delta” (Ogundiya, 2009).  
 
After the avoidable death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, ethnic militias began to arise and 
mushroom, confronting what they saw as the high-handed and despotic leadership 
style of the Abacha between the years 1993 - 1998. Within that period, too, 
Nigerians experienced the most severe political repression and economic hardship 
in the country’s history (Douglas, Kemedi, Okonta & Watts, 2004). According to 
Douglas et al (2004), the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) was established in the 
Yoruba-speaking southwest in 1994 largely to protest the annulment of the 1993 
elections in which Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim, had seemingly won the 
presidency. Led by mostly disenchanted Yoruba youth and supported by some of 
the Yoruba elite, the organization claimed that a “northern cabal” in the Army had 
denied Abiola victory and aggressively pressed for Yoruba political autonomy. Two 
vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), emerged in the Igbo-speaking southeast two 
years later. MASSOB claimed that the Nigerian state and its functionaries had 
systematically oppressed the Igbo since the end of the civil war and sought to 
secure self-determination by resuscitating the Republic of Biafra, whose bid to 
secede from the Federation was crushed by Nigerian troops in 1970. The Arewa 
People’s Congress (APC) emerged in the north in 1999 as a reaction to the killing 
of northern elements in Lagos and other Yoruba cities and towns by OPC cadres, 
and as a foil to the new Obasanjo government which many northerners viewed as 
a “Yoruba regime”. The APC claimed that the harassment of northerners in the 
southwest was part of a Yoruba plan to secede and establish an “Oodua Republic” 
and that President Obasanjo was sympathetic to it. The group threatened to go to 
war if necessary to prevent national dismemberment. These and other ethnic 
militias heated up the polity by seeking to protect the interests of their ethnic 
constituencies, employed jungle justice to fight their real and perceived enemies 
and played sectional roles in the political life of the nation as party thugs, enforcers, 
and champions of local interests. 
 
While these ethnic militias were contained by the democratic government of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, the next phase of engagement with government by 
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disenchanted Niger Delta youths was spearheaded by Niger Delta militants who 
unleashed violent attacks and bombings of oil installations, kidnapping, hostage 
taking and assault to press home their demands. The “judicial murder” of Ken Saro 
Wiwa, their worthy ambassador and mediator had created a leadership vacuum 
which over 150 militant ethnic groups scrambled to fill. While these militants have 
earned titles such as terrorists, criminals, ethnic militias, rebels, freedom fighters, 
insurgents, revolutionaries and political agitators (Adejumobi & Aderemi, 2002; 
Ikporukpo, 2007; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2006; Osaghae, 1995; Suberu, 1996, 2001), 
some scholars have argued that the Niger Delta militants employed terrorist 
strategies in the pursuit of their grievances which constituted a serious threat to 
the economy, human and national security and pitched the country in the league 
of terrorist trouble spots around the world (Ogundiya, 2009; Okafor, 2011). 
 
However, the rise of the Boko Haram terrorists in Northern Nigeria had been 
predated by similar uprisings in the past. It was just that the Boko Haram-styled 
terror acts assumed a more virulent, sophisticated and religious dimension. 
Adesoji (2010) in his erudite treatise traced the evolution of the crisis to the 
Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in 
Yola and 1985 in Bauchi. These were the first attempts to impose a religious 
ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria, and marked the beginning of ferocious 
post-independence conflict and crises in that region (Ibrahim, 1997; Isichei, 1987). 
Following the Maitatsine crises, or interspersing them, were several other crises. 
These include the Kano metropolitan riot of October 1982, the Ilorin riot of March 
1986, the University of Ibadan crisis of May 1986, the nationwide crisis over 
Nigeria’s membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 
January/February 1986, the Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/Funtua religious riots of 
March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of March 1988, the acrimonious 
nationwide debate on Sharia (Islamic law) at the Constituent Assembly in 
October/November 1988, the Bayero University crisis of 1989, the Bauchi/Katsina 
riots of March/April 1991, the Kano riot of October 1991, the Zangon-Kataf riot of 
May 1992, the Kano civil disturbance of December 1991 and the Jos crisis of April 
1994 (Imo 1995;Ibrahim 1997; Enwerem 1999).  
 
Similarly, between 1999 and 2008, 28 other conflicts were reported, the most 
prominent being the Shagamu conflict of July 1999 and the recurrent Jos crises 
between 2001-2008 (Akaeze 2009; Omipidan 2009). The crisis recurred in 
January 2010 and has become recurrent till date.Virtually all these crises, many of 
which took a violent turn, have been explained or justified by one reason or the 
other. Where the crisis was not borne out of the need to curb the excesses of some 
groups, prevent them from being a security threat, or contain their spread, as was 
the case with the Maitatsine riots (Albert 1999; Ladan 1999), it arose out of the 
proselytization drive by one religious group and the resistance by another religious 
group of its perceived stronghold. This was the case with the Kano riot of 1991 
during which Muslims complained of preferential treatment in the approval of 
conduct of a religious crusade by Christians and the use of Kano Race Course 
earlier not approved for Muslims to hold a similar program (Albert 1999; Williams 
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1997). In some other cases, it was the seemingly unresolved indigene-settler 
problem that was at its root. The Zangon-Kataf riots and the recurrent Jos crises 
fall into this category (Nwosu 1996; Williams 1999; Ibrahim 1998; Uchendu 2004; 
Human Rights Watch 2005). Although almost all the crises have been subsumed 
under religion and explained by even some authors as religious factors, it is 
apparent that other extraneous and underlying factors like economic 
disequilibrium/inequality, envy, poverty among youths (who easily become willing 
tools in the hand of barons), and the unhealthy contest for political offices have all 
played parts (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Ibrahim 1997; Sulaiman 2008). 
Ibrahim’s assertion corroborated by Ladan that all ethno-religious crises have 
behind them a perceived domination by supposedly external or illegitimate groups 
is quite accurate in this case (Ibrahim 1998; Ladan 1999). Specifically, the 
Maitatsine uprisings, which are comparable to those of Boko Haram in terms of 
philosophy and objectives, organizational planning, armed resistance and modus 
operandi, have generally been explained by a combination of factors like economic 
dislocation, deprivation, and income inequalities, as well as poverty aided by local 
disasters like drought and a rinderpest (cattle plague) pandemic, all with links to 
Islam. Significantly, many of the explanations offered for the outbreak of the 
Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s are relevant to the Boko Haram uprising. 
 
The Boko Haram sect is a radical Islamic fundamentalist organization that has 
been described as the Nigerian Taliban. Boko Haram translates to “western 
education is a sin” and its members follow a strict interpretation of the Koran. Boko 
Haram is built on an Islamic faith that its members consider as the panacea for the 
country’s endemic moral, social, political, and economic problems; hence, their 
determination to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state to be ruled on the 
basis of the “Sharia.” This doctrinal foundation makes the Boko Haram similar to 
other terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), Al 
Shabaab, Ansauru, Hezbollah, the Islamic State, and others, whose cause is 
entwined in and driven by Islamic fundamentalism. Followers of such groups are 
a menace to society, especially in situations where their target is a secular state that 
supports, without let or hindrance, the co-existence of multiple religious sects. 
Their attempt to impose their will on adherents of other religions certainly leads 
to disaster. Even in Northern Nigeria where Sharia law has already taken root, 
Boko Haram terror messengers believe they can only achieve their version of 
extremist Islamic rule by overthrowing the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
According to Australia’s Counterterrorism White Paper (Australian Government, 
2010), many terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaeda, Boko Haram and their 
ilk share a common distorted narrative, in spite of differing and often local 
objectives, which narrowly and simplistically interprets history and current affairs 
through the lens of the alleged oppression of Muslims, principally by the West. 
These groups want people to believe that: 
 
 the West, led by the United States of America, is engaged in the systematic 
exploitation and repression of Muslims; 
 governments in Muslim majority countries are illegitimate, corrupt and un-
Islamic; 
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 the solution is the removal of Western interference in Muslim majority 
countries and the establishment of “truly Islamic” systems of governance; 
and 
 it is the religious duty of all Muslims individually to use violence to attack 
the political, military, religious and cultural enemies of Islam anywhere 
around the world. 
 
These groups advocate Islamic justice for the poor and want to ultimately abolish 
“western influence”.  
 
As Adesoji (2010) noted, the Boko Haram uprising was not the first forcible 
attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society, but like the 
first major attempt and subsequent small-scale attempts, it has widened the scope 
of Islamic revivalism, and escalated the use of terror and violence including suicide 
terrorism in expressing their grievances. Adesoji adds that despite the brutal 
suppression of previous attempts, the gallantry of the Boko Haram soldiers to 
recuperate, the spread and swiftness of its military organization, and the belief of 
its leadership, and perhaps its membership, that it could successfully engage a 
modern state in a military duel all show an extraordinary commitment to their 
cause. Boko Haram terrorist organization has adopted al-Qaeda-styled terrorist 
strategy which is decentralized, elusive and difficult to neutralize. They also 
pledged their “Bay’at” or allegiance to the Islamic State, the world’s most lethal 
Islamic Jihadist group up until now with bizarre signatures of religious 
intolerance, a global Islamic expansionary agenda, and a caliphate-building 
strategy. Boko Haram’s terror performances have repeatedly pointed to the 
shortcomings of the Nigerian security forces, highlighted the need to step up 
security in the country, the effective patrol of the country’s porous borders and the 
need to address the salient etiologies that necessitated the rise of ethnic militias, 
Niger Delta militants and generally domestic terrorism in Nigeria. Authors 
contend that this status quo points to the need by the political leadership to create 
forums for national conversation in order to renegotiate the terms of engagement 
of the various ethnic nationalities that make up the federation.  
 
Reflecting on the Etiologies of Terrorism in Nigeria 
The causes of terrorism are abundant in the terrorism literature. However, Khan 
(2003) has identified the following etiologies as central to the manifestation of 
terrorism within society. These factors could be applied to the Nigerian situation. 
They include: 
 
First, ethnicity, nationalism/separatism. In this sense, an aggrieved group 
could resort to terrorist toga and strategies to achieve nationalist or separatist 
goals. However, ethnic conflict could arise from a complex combination of class, 
inequality, political opportunity, mobilization resources and "ethnic strength". 
Second, poverty and economic disadvantage, globalization. The 
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asymmetry in the distribution of scarce resources and benefits within the state can 
push vulnerable groups to take up arms and unleash terror on an apathetic and 
complacent population and the establishment. Many terrorist groups also have 
arisen out of the links they share with international terrorist organizations. Third, 
absence of democracy. Democracy, in its truest sense, is supposed to be 
representative of the people, their wishes and interests. However, because this is 
not always the case in reality, terrorism can arise in a democracy in two occasions: 
(1), when there is a case of a minority whose basic rights and liberties are denied 
or taken away by arbitrary action of the government or its agencies; and (2), when 
one minority is attacked by another minority and does not receive adequate 
protection from the state and its forces of law and order. In other words, those who 
are the subjects of a liberal state, but who are not admitted to its rights of 
citizenship cannot be morally bound to show allegiance or obedience to the state. 
They are not bound by political obligation either because they have not been 
accorded any rights by the state (Wilkinson, 1977). Fourth, disaffected 
intelligentsia. Rubenstein (1987) believes that terrorism could be triggered by 
disgruntled and disaffected, intelligentsia who are in a social and moral crisis 
unable to mobilize the masses. When rigid social stratification shatters hopes for 
social transformation, then the ingredients are present for a start or rise in terrorist 
activities in an attempt to reconnect with the masses who they claim to represent 
and aspire to lead. Fifth, dehumanization. This is the opposite of the concept of 
disaffected intelligentsia as it represents simple-minded people who are easy to be 
indoctrinated and swayed into believing that they need to fight to be heard, 
recognized and treated as equal human beings in the society. Lastly, religion. 
Religion has become a vital opium that some groups feed on to misinterpret the 
requirements of their religion and to carry out their fundamentalist beliefs which 
are generally aimed at conquering, expanding and consolidating on their religious 
gains and territories. 
 
In support of some of the points raised above, speaking before the UN Sixth 
Committee in October 2009, the Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations 
stressed that in adopting a global and comprehensive response to terrorism, a 
coherent international response must give priority attention to addressing 
underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, such as poverty, 
prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism, ethnic, 
national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic 
marginalization and lack of good governance. This he said should be supported by 
respect for human rights and the promotion of the rule of law as a sine qua non to 
the successful combating of terrorism and the implementation of the strategy 
(Onemola, 2009). 
 
It has been observed that terrorism seems to thrive in West Africa, Nigeria 
inclusive, because of the linkage of development challenges and security (Ipe et al, 
2010). In other words, the sub-region suffers from recurring deficiencies in 
governance, a lack of state capacity to address a range of interlinked security and 
development challenges, a history of intra- and interstate conflict, and segments 
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of the population that are arguably increasingly vulnerable to radicalization and 
recruitment by extremist movements and criminal organizations.  
 
This view was shared by Look (2011) who posited that the roots of the problem are 
not only religion-oriented, but also are connected to the country’s economic 
hardships and unemployment, as well as to alienation from the central 
government. This includes the incapability and lack of political will of the 
government to handle these groups, which has allowed the spread and resurgence 
of Boko Haram, as they question the state’s capabilities. Due to the combination of 
religious revivalism and weak governance structures and process, there has been 
an uprising and growth of religious sects. 
 
According to Ibegbu (2009), poor governance, corruption, lack of social and basic 
amenities, and lack of security could lead to the rise of terrorist organizations as it 
is being witnessed in Nigeria. This view was shared by Trosper (2009) who averred 
that poor governance is the primary cause for terrorism in West Africa. Some 
reports also underpin this argument as they assert that weaknesses in democratic 
governance and factors contributing to fragility inhibit social development and 
economic growth, and this situation could cause civil unrest and provide fertile 
ground for the rise of extremist ideologies (Brown, 2006; UN, 2009; USAID, 
2008). Therefore, as weak governments increase in West Africa, the potential for 
terrorist safe havens to flourish within various regions might also increase. When 
this poor governance is allowed to exist, it becomes a sign for terrorist groups to 
organize and capitalize on the weaknesses of a country’s political and economic 
turmoil. Cilliers (2006) added climate change, competition over resources, and 
marginalization of the world’s poor majority as other factors that trigger terrorism 
within societies. 
 
In contextualizing the causes of terrorism in Nigeria, it is pertinent to point out 
that many years of poor governance, militarism and abandonment of the Niger 
Delta and Northern regions by the government and the conspiracy between the 
managers of the state and the local elite who connive with international 
bourgeoisie to expropriate the resources of these regions have led to the rise of a 
Frankenstein bent on taking its pound of flesh. For instance, the history of military 
dictatorships or autocratic rule, which fostered a legacy of peremptory political 
leadership that can be classified as one which practiced patrimonial rule and 
clientelism, created poorly run governments that legitimatized injustice, inequality 
and inequity among Nigeria’s population. 
 
However, Trosper (2009) argues that Nigeria, like its West African neighbors, is 
deluged by torrents of Islamic fundamentalist ideology due to the high 
concentration of African Muslims in the sub-region leading to the growing 
population of hardline Muslims who are clearly anti-American or Western and may 
provide a sanctuary for terrorists as a form of religious persuasion or devotion. 
Therefore, the issue that currently faces the US, Western and Christian elements is 
the radical ideology of Islam which is currently spreading in many West African 
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countries, posing a threat to anything not Islamic (Charisma Magazine, 2011; 
Elombah, 2011). 
 
Theoretical Paradigm 
The theory of religion has been adopted to analyze the emergence and activities of 
the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. According to notable criminologists (Kraemer, 
2004; Stitt, 2003), the disciplines of theology, religion, and philosophy have had 
important things to say about terrorism. To Hoffman (1993), about a quarter of all 
terrorist groups and about half of the most dangerous ones on earth are primarily 
motivated by religious concerns. They believe that God not only approves of their 
action, but that God also demands their action. Their cause is sacred, and consists 
of a combined sense of hope for the future and vengeance for the past. Of these two 
components, the backward-looking desire for vengeance may be the more 
important trigger for terrorism because the forward-looking component 
(apocalypse or eschatology) produces gullible and radicalized fanatics who are 
more a danger to themselves and their own people. The trick to successful use of 
terrorism in the name of religion rests upon convincing believers or converts that 
a "neglected duty" exists in the fundamental, mainstream part of the religion. 
Religious terrorism is, therefore, not about extremism, fanaticism, sects, or cults, 
but is instead all about a fundamentalist or militant interpretation of the basic 
tenets of a religion (Imhonopi & Urim, 2011). Some religious traditions are filled 
with plenty of violent images at their core, and destruction or self-destruction is a 
central part of the logic behind religion-based terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2001). 
Evil, which can assume any real or perceived entity, is often magnified and religion 
easily serves as moral cover for self-centered terrorists and psychopaths (Stitt, 
2003).  
 
To be sure, the usual pattern in religious-based terrorism is for a psychopathic, 
spiritual leader to arise that is regarded as somewhat eccentric at first (a tendency 
toward messianism). But then, as this leader develops his charisma, he tends to 
appear more and more mainstream and scholarly. He begins to mingle political 
and religious issues (a tendency toward theocracy), and little-known religious 
symbols or pieces of sacred text take on new significance. Quite often, these 
symbols are claimed to be an important part of that religion's history that has 
somehow been neglected. The stage is then set for blaming somebody for the 
betrayal of this sacred heritage. First, the politicians in one's own country are 
blamed, but soon a foreign influence, like secularization or modernization is 
blamed. Religious terrorists quickly move to blame a foreign influence for at least 
three reasons: (1) it does not serve the religion's survival interests to blame a 
homeland; (2) it makes use of a long history of competition, animosity, and war 
between the world's different religions; and (3) any blaming to be done must occur 
on the symbolic or cosmic level, which is to say that the enemy cannot have a face, 
but must be some impersonal, evil-like force or influence. Hence, the most specific 
enemy religious terrorists can have is some global trend like secularization, 
modernization, or Westernization. The strength of fundamentalism is its ability to 
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guarantee that a radical change is coming without specifying exactly what it will 
look like. However, once a semi-vague enemy has been identified, the religious 
movement borrows the idea of "sovereignty" from the political realm and begins to 
see itself as the legitimate defender of the faith and legitimate restorer of dignity 
to the homeland. Most importantly, such "defenders" justify terrorist actions in 
their accountability only to God, for it is God who has chosen them for this sacred 
mission in history.  
 
A theological linchpin of terrorism would be the notion that communal violence, 
even though violence is despised, is still a form of worship that may help discover 
the true nature of God and open up two-way communication with God. Religious 
terrorism can be quite extreme in its tactics. Not only does it strive to avenge a long 
history of persecution and injustice, but it frequently carries out preemptive 
attacks. This is because a high level of paranoia is usually maintained about the 
actual degree of threat that the enemy poses. Rarely are religious terrorists swayed 
by secular sources of information about the degree of actual threat, but instead are 
driven by doctrinal differences of opinion over interpretation of holy scriptures. 
This results in two things: (1) a rather non-selective targeting pattern, lashing out 
blindly, often harming innocents; and (2) the creation of numerous offshoot, spin-
off, or fringe groups who believe they are commanded to follow a different mission 
imperative. Add to this the fact that most adherents have already long felt like 
alienated and marginal members of society, and you have a recipe for perhaps the 
most dangerous or prolific kind of terrorism in the world today. 
 
Recruitment generally is followed by a reeducation program that changes the way 
a person thinks about good and evil. Anything foreign, secular, or modern without 
question becomes evil; and anything supporting an all-out, uncompromising 
struggle with the enemy, including the killing of innocents, becomes good. The only 
exceptions are when the group has freed up some nonviolent avenues of 
experimentation. It is important to understand the practice of martyrdom in the 
terrorist context. Not only does a martyr serve recruitment and other purposes 
after their death, but a whole mythology develops around them, which might be 
called a process of martyrology (Ranstorp 1996). Targets are chosen not for 
strategic purposes, but for symbolic purposes, and the repercussions of an attack 
are managed as well. The ideal target is one in which the martyr can inflict more 
damage than is expected for their size. The idea is to produce an impression that 
the group is larger and more powerful than it actually is.  
 
Religious terrorists demonstrate marvelous ingenuity in means, methods, and 
timing, but their targeting is flawed, and one can only wonder how strategically 
effective is their "symbolic" success from "striking at the heart of the infidels." 
Perhaps the whole reason for it is to bolster their reputation among other religious 
communities. This would be supported by the fact that some terrorist acts are 
scheduled on dates specifically designed to desecrate a competitor's religious 
holidays and sacred moments. In all fairness, it should be said that most militant 
religious groups only adopt terrorism as a tactic of last resort.  
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Examining the Spectral Bite of Terrorism on Nigeria’s Industrial Development 
Generally, industrial development only thrives in an atmosphere of security, socio-
economic and political stability and peace. With the creation of an environment of 
violence, destruction of infrastructure, unleashing of bloodletting, fear, terror, 
incessant and unpredictable killings, kidnappings, hostage-taking, carjacking, 
harassment, threats and bombings, including suicide bombings, emissaries of 
violence have inadvertently or wittingly put a cog in the wheel of industrial 
development and progress with adverse effects on the immediate affected states in 
Nigeria and on the country as a whole. Terrorism has given a spectral bite to 
industrial development in Nigeria and will limit the quest of the country to achieve 
its industrialization agenda if not checked. Although the impact of terror on 
industry in the country is miscellaneous, the following points are worth noting. 
 
First, many Nigerians are no longer able to meet their social obligations in 
flashpoints where terrorist activities are rife because of the palpable fear of being 
killed or injured which could bring about permanent disability. On the periphery, 
this might look harmless and extraneous to industrial development, but probing 
further, this situation portends a lot of damage on the growth of business as 
citizens who may have to meet outdoors over breakfast, lunch or dinner to discuss 
business issues may not be willing to take the risk. It is common knowledge that so 
many deals are closed in informal settings such as on golf courses, on lawn tennis 
courts, during social get-togethers and in eating establishments. People are forced 
to limit their social engagements which have the potential of facilitating 
commercial activities and they become excessively cagey of outdoor activities 
which could expose them to terror attacks. Industry, therefore, is left in the lurch. 
Second, there is mass exodus of large corporations and small medium enterprises 
(SMEs) to commercial centers outside terror hot spots to preserve their 
investments and business.  
 
Incessant bombings and bloodcurdling chaos in the North and the erstwhile Niger 
Delta militant strongholds have forced many large and small businesses to move 
out of the regions. This is because the owners of such businesses are not willing to 
risk their investments and capital. For instance, in the North where Boko Haram 
operatives have continued to target small business operators they consider selling 
goods forbidden to Muslims, some of these small business owners who survive 
such attacks move their businesses to other states within and outside the North 
where their businesses can be safeguarded from wanton destruction. Thus, not 
only are they moving their businesses, the taxes they pay to state and local 
governments are withdrawn, employment of indigenes in such businesses 
plummet and the supply chain, which could involve large or small manufacturers 
of such products or both is severed especially if such owners are killed or are unable 
to continue such businesses. In other words, terrorism leads to the disruption of 
SMEs within the value chain with a deleterious ricocheting impact on industrial 
development. Third, there is mass exodus of skilled workers of Southern and 
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Northern origins to other parts of the country or to their states of origin for safety. 
Many of these workers are tired of the threat to their lives and property and have 
decided to move out of the trouble areas. The emigration of these skilled workers 
to other parts of Nigeria will definitely starve the industries that remain in the 
terror zones of the needed manpower to run their business processes. This 
ultimately could lead to more costs in terms of hiring and insurance and sometimes 
when some skilled workers are hard to get could spell the death or discontinuation 
of the business or an entire industry.  
 
Fourth, the state of insecurity has lowered the trade velocity within and between 
states in the North where Boko Haram terror activities have lingered. Without 
trade activities, employment cannot be generated, personal economies will bite the 
dust, goods and services cannot be bought or sold creating scarcity due to lack of 
supplies, inflation in the local economy will arise, traders may no longer be able to 
sell as the population of consumers to buy the products dips and commercial 
activities could grind to a halt making it impossible for financial intermediaries 
like commercial banks, microfinance institutions and finance houses to close shop 
or move their businesses elsewhere. Fifth, the economy of the North-West and 
North-East is in tatters as most suppliers of goods and services to the North have 
withdrawn their services for fear of becoming targets for terrorist attacks. There is 
the destruction of markets and market linkages. This has further slowed industrial 
development and led to the shutting down of industrial processes. 
 
Sixth, the transport system to the North that facilitates the conveyance of goods 
and human beings is also adversely affected. A story was making its rounds in the 
media where innocent travelers were stopped in some parts of the North and where 
summarily executed if they were not of Northern origin. While the intent of this 
article is not to fan the embers of hate, it is really to draw attention to the impact 
this state of affairs could have on the domestic economy in the North. Some 
organizations in the Southern part of Nigeria dependent on agricultural supplies 
from the North have also lost countless businesses and customers as a result of the 
inability of suppliers from that region to meet their targets. Local production is 
grossly affected and limited and many of these manufacturers are looking to states 
in the South to make up for the shortfall or replace their northern business allies.  
 
Seventh, the mass departure of foreign expatriates in the Niger Delta and some 
parts of the North with their investments sends a very strong message to the 
international business community that Nigeria is not ready to accommodate 
foreign direct investments and to do business with the world. Eighth, huge 
financial cost of infrastructure repairs, insurance, security and others puts more 
burden on government and diverts scarce resources that could have been 
channeled into other critical investment areas. This further slows industrial 
development and takes the country some inches backwards in development terms. 
Ninth, terrorism in some parts of Nigeria has led to the disruption of academic 
calendar of secondary and tertiary institutions. Affected schools are shut down and 
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affected students stay back at home for fear of being killed, kidnapped or injured 
by the terror envoys.  
 
This situation throws these students into the streets and even makes the situation 
worse as some of them could become targets or recruits for the terror gangs. Also, 
industry suffers because the products of these institutions who upon graduation 
could help to provide the critical human capital needed to run the industrial 
processes in place are forced to remain at home or leave the trouble spots 
momentarily or for good. Lastly, terrorism in different parts of Nigeria has limited 
the tourism and hospitality potentials of the country or affected states. For 
example, Bauchi State with its Yankari Game Reserve, Sokoto with its Argungu 
Festival and Jos in Plateau State touted as the Tin City with its temperate climate 
have experienced low or non-existing patronage as many citizens and foreign 
tourists no longer go to such places for fear of becoming targets to the terror 
bloodhounds. Hostage-taking and kidnappings of expatriates have also reduced 
the number of these visitors to such unique tourist places and denied the respective 
governments concerned the income, goodwill and business opportunities that 
could have been generated from such rendezvous.  
 
A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Fighting Terrorism in Nigeria 
Tackling Boko Haram-styled terrorism and any form of terrorism in Nigeria goes 
beyond the resources and capabilities of government and its agencies. The hydra-
headed terror monster, with its international allies and financing, requires more 
commitment, resources and support from many more stakeholders including 
government and its security agencies but extending to regional bodies, the 
international community, civil society, business community and faith 
organizations. 
 
For space constraints, this study has summarized the roles sub-regional, regional 
and international bodies can play in fighting terrorism in Africa.  
 
The African Union’s 2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism in Africa must not remain a mere legal instrument. Its provisions must 
be enforceable such that the operations of terror gangs and their sponsors are 
checkmated in any part of Africa. Through its African Centre for the Study and 
Research on Terrorism (ACSRT, the technical arm of AU on terrorism), AU 
member-states, the regional economic commissions and the United Nations 
should engage in greater information sharing, cooperation and coordination, with 
a view to raising awareness of terrorist threats across Africa and helping African 
states gain access to needed capacity-building assistance. The United Nations 
should continue to help African states through the AU to provide the needed 
logistics, capacity building, technical and monetary resources for increased 
surveillance of their many porous borders, information sharing among these states 
and the equipment of national security agencies with modern gadgets and training 
to combat terrorists in the region. There is also the need to continue to build the 
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capacity of law enforcement and other criminal justice officials from West African 
countries to fight the rising menace of terror merchants within the sub-region. 
Promoting community policing as part of the options for patrolling borders is 
critical to winning the war against terrorism. Member states of ECOWAS must 
work in conjunction with the ECOWAS Commission to finalize and adopt a sub-
regional strategy and plan of action for addressing threats from terrorism and 
violent extremism in West Africa that is driven by local and sub-regional needs and 
priorities.  
 
The United States and European Union have numerous investments and interests 
in Nigeria and West Africa because of the latter’s rich oil and mineral deposits. To 
support the war against terrorism in Nigeria and against its West African 
neighbours, the United States and the EU must be involved in counterterrorism 
capacity-building assistance of countries in the sub-region. This support should be 
extended to the rigorous implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on 
illicit drug trafficking and organized crime by “increasing operational capacities of 
ECOWAS, its Commission as well as ECOWAS Member States, and their deeper 
involvement in addressing” these illicit activities (Ipe et al., 2010). The US and EU 
should facilitate horizontal security cooperation among the states in the sub-
region, strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities; enhance and 
institutionalize cooperation among the region’s security forces; promote 
democratic governance; discredit terrorist ideology; and reinforce bilateral 
military ties with these world powers as a measure of strengthening the weak states 
in the sub-region. The US and EU should support efforts to improve education and 
health; and provide counterterrorism training in marksmanship and border patrol 
to the militaries of partner countries.  
 
Donors should employ a two-level approach to assessing and funding Strategy-
related activities in West Africa: one at the national level that identifies local 
priorities and gaps that need immediate attention; the other at the sub-regional 
level, by focusing on multilateral activities that strengthen and sustain cooperation 
among ECOWAS member states. 
 
Non-traditional actors such as civil society groups, NGOs, foundations, public-
private partnerships, and private businesses are some of the most capable and 
credible partners in local communities. A strategy that provides a common 
framework for Nigeria, its West African neighbors, ECOWAS, and civil society to 
engage in counterterrorism issues and built on the rich contributions of civil 
society to further human security in West Africa must be put in place. Given the 
importance of ensuring national and sub-regional ownership over the 
counterterrorism agenda in Nigeria and West Africa, more attention should be 
given to reaching out to and involving civil society in this area. Outreach by states 
and multilateral bodies to Nigerian and West African civil society groups on 
strategy-related issues should involve engagement with grassroots organizations, 
including youth and women’s groups, and academic researchers and think-tanks 
to develop locally based, credible assessments of terrorism-related threats and 
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vulnerabilities in the sub-region. Efforts by civil society groups should aim at 
promoting the rule of law, good governance, and peace and security, as well as the 
broader economic, social, and political development of Nigeria and the sub-region.  
 
Religious leaders must begin to look critically at ways to engage their followers and 
memberships and guide them by correctly interpreting their scriptural beliefs, 
avoiding the temptation of invoking hate, bigotry and extremism in all 
interactions. There must be respect for other faiths and the differences involved in 
worship. There must also be respect for human lives. Seminars, conferences and 
workshops must be held by faith organizations to retrain religious leaders to abide 
by the true doctrines of their faith without violating the rights of others to freedom 
of worship. To fight the Boko Haram menace, Nigeria can adopt the example 
shown by the Saudi government to checkmate terrorism within the kingdom. 
According to (Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, 2008), the Saudi Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs launched an extensive media campaign to educate young Saudis on 
the ―correct teachings of Islam in order to prevent them from becoming drawn to 
extremist doctrines. The campaign included messages incorporated into Friday 
sermons at mosques, distribution of literature and tapes, and publication of 
articles on the Internet. As part of the campaign, the government published a book 
in October entitled, "Guarding Against Terrorism." The government also recently 
began to issue identification cards to imams and religious leaders to curb instances 
of unauthorized persons delivering Friday sermons.  
 
Meanwhile, these initiatives will only work when Nigeria and its West African 
neighbors lead the development of these strategies. 
Conclusion 
Terrorism raises the vote allocated to security. In an industrially and 
infrastructurally deficient economy, such monies could have been well utilized for 
development purposes. Ironically, since development cannot take place within a 
context of insecurity, these votes become a desideratum to raise the level of 
security formation so that economic and other activities can be sustained. The 
etiology of terrorism in Nigeria is traceable to a history of asymmetry in resource 
allocation and warped resource allocation formulae, marginalization of some 
groups within the Nigerian society, official and elite corruption, subjugation of 
minority groups and their rights, environmental pollution of the Niger Delta, the 
supply of arms and ammunition to political thugs who later metamorphose into 
terrorist armies, ethnic and religious rivalries and bigotry and the quest for self-
determination by ethnic groups. While government must address the issues of 
corruption, youth unemployment, illiteracy of many citizens, poverty of the 
vulnerable sectors, poor healthcare, environmental pollution, poor governance 
processes and the different weaknesses of the state, already identified as the 
problems that initiated and have sustained the incidence of terrorism in Nigeria, it 
is important that government accedes to the request by interest groups within the 
polity to convene a truly national conversation to determine the terms of 
engagement of the nationalities that make up the Nigerian commonwealth. 
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Meanwhile, to quell the raging inferno of terror acts in the country, the job falls on 
the table of not only the government, but also other stakeholders whose interests 
in the continuity of the Nigerian project could be damaged if the polity is overrun 
by terror gangs whatever their names or raisons d'être. The international 
community, faith organizations, civil society, business community and others have 
to conflate their roles in order to obliterate or checkmate terrorism in Nigeria and 
create the needed breather for industrial development to happen. 
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